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(1) Some characteristics of transitional crisis 
 
The first point that I would like to discuss in my paper refers to some 
characteristics of transitional crisis. The Croatian economy, like all the 
other countries in transition, passes through a very difficult transitional 
crisis. That transitional crisis has been manifested in  drastic decrease 
of gross domestic product, employment, productivity, all categories of 
consumption, salaries and wages, and standard of living in general. 
This sharp fall in  production and consumption took place 
simultaneously with high rates of escalating inflation. That can be 
illustrated by the data from table 1. 
 
Such a drastic fall in the gross  domestic product that no other country 
in transition has suffered can  be  noticed at first glance, when 
compared with those countries in transition with which Croatia can be 
objectively compared. 
 
The fall in gross domestic product in 1993 to the half of the prewar 
(1990 level is very rare in the  recent history of our civilization).That is 
by far a more difficult situation than that prevailing in the world up the 
end of the twenties and the  beginning  of  the thirties, a period of the 
big world crisis. Although a decrease in industrial production was 
somewhat milder attaining somewhat less  than three fifths of the 
prewar level, the economic policy was confronted  with  hardly  solvable  
 
                                                          
1 The main ideas of this paper have been presented at the Workshop of European 
Economic Interaction and Inegration, Session XV, organised by The Vienna 
Institute for Comparative Economic Studies under the title "Transformation of the 
East European Economies, 1989-1993: critical assessments and ways out of the 
crisis", Vienna 21 to 25 November 1993. 
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tasks and problems. The employment decreased to about three 
quarters of the prewar level, while unemployment increased by almost 
three fifths. Labour productivity decreased below three quarters of the 
prewar level, and the average wage of the employee below two fifths. 
Population expenditures on goods and services decreased to 44,7 %, 
and investments to 17,6 % in relation to the last prewar year (1990). 
During the first nine months of 1993, unemployment rate amounted to 
17,6 % . At the same time monthly inflation was 27,5 %. 
Although the other countries in transition are also confronted with a 
difficult transitional crisis, the intensiveness of this crisis is markedly 
less than in Croatia. 
A spontaneous question arises here, as to why the manifestations of 
the transitional crisis in Croatia are far  more  expressed  than  in  other  
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countries in transition. In the answer to  this  question, some 
peculiarities specific for Croatia should be underlined. The first such 
peculiarity refers to the war, war damages (which amounted nearly 20 
bil. USA $, (Table 2), war devastation and war expenditures. Over one 
quarter of the whole state territory was occupied. During 1992 and 
1993, there was a huge number of refugees and displaced persons in 
Croatia. Their number has been between 300 and 600 thousand. They 
are displaced persons from the occupied territories of Croatia or 
refugees from various parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. 
According to the data from The Office for Refugees and Displaced 
Persons of The Republic of Croatia of August 25, 1993, there were 
239.785 refugees and 249.199 displaced persons registered in Croatia, 
which along with the estimated 37.050 unregistered displaced persons 
amounts to 526.034. Besides, 77.500 refugees from  Croatia are in 
other European countries.1 Average costs for one displaced person and 
refugee  are  in  the  fast  approximation  about  3  US $ daily. In  spite 
of the big humanitarian help, the budget of the Republic of Croatia 
suffers a huge burden of support expenses for this huge number of 
refugees and displaced persons. 
 
The second peculiarity refers to the fact that the Republic of Croatia 
became independent, sovereign and internationally recognized state 
not before 1992. A group of researchers from The Institute of 
Economics Zagreb, evaluating by the help of the simulation model the 
causes of such a drastic fall  in  production  and  consumption in 
Croatia, have come to the approximate conclusion that one half of this 
decrease in all relevant macroeconomic  aggregates  can be ascribed 
to the war and all its consequences. The second half is caused by the 
loss of the market. This loss of the market refers to  the former 
Yugoslav market as well as to the market of the other ex-socialist 
countries (Marendic-1992).2 Recession in developed economies of the 
western world, surely influenced also directly or indirectly economic 




All in all, transitional crisis in Croatia, along with the general causes 
present in all countries in transition, has some special causes 
depending on the war, and the recently achieved state independence. 
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(2) Property and market transition 
 
The second point that I would like to discuss in my paper is that 
transition of the ownership in Croatia has begun like in the most ex-
socialist countries with many dilemmas and hesitations. Those 
dilemmas and hesitations were similar and different in some aspects, 
relative to other countries in transition. Similarities refer to the choice of 
the method for the ownership pluralization in the direction of 
privatization. The basic question was whether to apply as a starting 
method of privatization the selling (with greater or smaller benefits) or 
some other method, including the distribution of the capital. The 
difference lies in the fact that in Croatia unlike in other countries in 
transition, the social instead of the state ownership was predominant. 
Property rights derived from the social ownership are closer to the 
property rights derived from the private ownership than from the state 
ownership. The reason is that the macroeconomic environment based 
on social ownership presumes the function of the market for goods and 
services, independence of the economic subjects, and the 
decentralization of economic decisions. 
 
On the occasion of the preparation of The Law on Privatization of Social 
Firms, a group of authors of The Institute of Economics Zagreb 
prepared a study "Privatization in the Policy of Economic 
Development"(Zdunić 1991).3 A starting basis of this study was that in 
Croatia a transition of social into this private property was necessary. 
That mans that the transition should not be achieved by returning to the 
state ownership, but by direct transformation into private ownership. 
This study suggested the application of the model of the open strategy, 
according to which privatization would be carried out on the basis of 
different methods. As the basic methods the following have been 
suggested: 
 
 a method of privatization of various subjects in property by 
means of a free distribution of primary issue of shares; 
 a method of participation in ownership by means of internal and 
external shares; 
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 a method of coexistence (competition) of social and private 
ownership. 
 
On the basis of these three basic groups of methods, all possible 
combinations should be permitted depending on a concrete situation 
and various characteristics (sectoral, regional, market, etc.) Although 
the Law on Privatization of Social Firms was based on the model of the 
open strategy which includes the application of various methods, there 
were some essential deviations from the study mentioned above. Basic 
deviations consist in the determination of the strict timing and deadlines 
for the process of privatization itself. All enterprises which do not 
undergo privatization in a given time limit are transferred to the 
ownership of the Fund for Privatization which has to continue with the 
process of transition (i.e., privatization). Deviations from the proposals 
of the study consist also in the marginalization of the application of the 
methods of distribution of one part of the social capital. 
 
The following basic methods have been foreseen: a) selling, b) debt 
equity conversion, c) privatization through additional capital. The selling 
includes the purchase of shares by those employed in the firm within a 
limit of DM 20.000 with a discount of 20% plus 1 % for each year in 
service (of the employee). They were given also a beneficial payment 
possibility of 5 years having to pay in the first year only 5% cf the total 
amount foreseen. 
 
Those employed in the firm can buy only up to 50% of the total share 
capital. The law enables also the funds for Health, Pension and 
Disability insurance to participate in the purchase of the social capital 
up to the amount of 30% though the Law on denationalization has not 
yet been passed, the sources for the compensation of the further 
owners have been also foreseen. 
 
June 30, 1992 was determined as a deadline for the ownership 
transformation into private or state ownership. By this date, The Agency 
for Restructuring and Development and The Croatian Fund for 
Development,   received   requests   for   the   so   called   autonomous 
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transformation from 2422 firms, which represents about two thirds of the 
total number of 3600 social firms to which The Law of Privatization of 
Social Firms refers.4 
 
The process of transformation of social firms has been continued in 
such a way that by the end of September 1993, 2818 firms, submitted 
their programs  to The Croatian Fund for Privatization. The distribution 
of these firms by sectors has been shown in Table 3. 2082 firms 
received approval for the transformation, and most  of  the  others had 
to receive decisions by the end of 1993. Up to now, transformation has 
been carried out in 1759 firms. From the total number  of firms where 
the transformation has been carried out, 845 (48 %) have been 
completely privatized, in 263 (15 %) the funds have become the 
predominant owners, while in 651 (37 %) the funds have minority 
shares. About 350.000 contracts were made with the buyers of the 
shares. The greatest number of buyers (80 %) negotiated a progress 
payment during the period of five years but most of them  paid  only  5 
% in the first year. Therefore, the figure of 845 wholly privatized firms 
must be taken with a great caution. The final payment was achieved in 
only 13.620 cases, which represent only 4 % of the total number of the 
contracts signed. The total amounts from the sale of firms were about 
DM 476 million by the end of September, out of which DM 176 million 
(37 %) was in cash and about DM 300 million (63 %) represented "old 
foreign currency savings", which had been transformed into public debt5 
That means that only DM 176 million represent additional 
financial'resources, while DM 300 million is a decrease in public debt. 
Having in mind that total social capital of Croatia  has  been estimated 
at about DM 40 billion, these resources represent less than 1,5 % . All 





Why are the effects of transformation so modest? There are two main 
reasons. The first is a very limited purchasing power of domestic 
buyers. The second refers to the very big restraint of foreign buyers, 
because Croatia is a country of high risk. 
 
An especially important question at this moment is state ownership 
which is dominant in Croatia. From the aspect of a desirable 
macroeconomic environment characterizing the market economy, it 
does not represent a step forward, but just the opposite. Whether such 
ownership structure will represent a greater or smaller problem for the 
total  transition  of  the Croatian economy will depend upon the faster or 
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slower transformation (not of social but of state) into the private 
ownership. The Croatian fund for privatization is obliged to put all the 
shares obtained in the transformation on sale through  the  Zagreb 
stock exchange, as a rule. Up to now, the shares of 188 firms have 
been offered for sale through the stock exchange. The total  value of 
the shares sold amounts to DM 22,8 million, which is more than 
modest. 
 
In an effort to intensify the sale of shares, the Fund will also along with 
the stock exchange, sell the shares in its property through the public 
offers and public bidding. Some firms in the infrastructure and power 
supply would however remain as public and state property. 
 
Having in mind a high level of interdependence between the transition 
of ownership, in the direction of predominant role of private property, 
and the transition of market institutions, especially institutions of capital 
and labour market, the present structure of property in Croatia is very 
unsatisfactory. During four decades of reforms in Croatia, the 
institutions of the goods and services market were developed. However, 
the institutions, mechanisms and instruments of labour and capital 
market are at the very beginning. 
 
Privatization in Croatia has been also carried out through a big number 
of new small firms. A total number of firms increased from 17.350 in 
December 1990 to 66.091 in April 1993. The biggest increase is in 
trade, industry, building, hotel and catering trade and in financial 
facilities. These small firms are very significant for the development of 
the entrepreneurship and employment, but their role is still marginal in 
the structure of capital.7 
 
The continuation of the process of property transition at this rate would 
last not only for many years but for several decades. Considering all 
these reasons, discussions about the necessity of accelerating 
transformation in direction of privatization, have intensified in 
professional and political circles. There is some evidence that the 
economic policy will very probably  by  the  end  of 1993 or beginning of 
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1994 start applying also the method of distribution of one part of social, 
respectively state capital (by means of shares and vouchers) to the 
workers and citizens. During September of this year the distribution of 
the shares to the disabled persons of the homeland war and to the 
families of the fallen soldiers amounted to about DM 9.6 million. 
 
At the end of all these considerations it is not necessary to underline, 
that the faster privatization (including also a method of the distribution of 
vouchers) represents an essential condition for a more efficient 
transition of the market, as well as for the total market character of the 
Croatian economy. That is at the same time the essential condition for 
the implementation of the macroeconomic stabilization policy, for more 




(3) Transition of macroeconomic environment 
 
The third point that I would like to underline refers to the transition of the 
macroeconomic environment. One of the main tasks of that transition is 
the creation of the macroeconomic frameworks for an efficient 
transformation (to paraphrase Janos Kornai) from "Soft Budget 
Constraints" to "Hard Budget Constraints".9 In Croatia (which has, as it 
is known, a long reformatory tradition), the radical reforms in that 
direction began at the end of 1989 and at the beginning of 1990. These 
radical changes continued more intensively at the beginning of 1992 
when The Republic of Croatia became an independent and 
internationally recognized state, and when Croatian dinar was 
introduced as national currency. Legal bases concerning the total 
monetary and fiscal spheres, the function of the Central bank and 
commercial banks, the function of firms and the labour and property 
relations, including also external direct investments and joint ventures, 
as well as the complex of foreign trade and foreign exchange system, 
created such institutional frames which are very similar to those in the 
countries with market economies. 
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Some other relevant laws will be adopted soon, such as The 
Corporation Law (which presents a basis of the economic legislation in 
market economies), The Securities Law and some others, what will 
make the macroeconomic environment even more similar to that of the 
countries of the developed market economy. Adequate changes will be 
introduced in the tax system and policy. The intention is to make the 
complex of taxation more transparent, convenient and attractive to all 
domestic as well as to the foreign investors. It is probable that the 
preparations for the introduction of VAT would continue when the 
circumstances permit. 
 
Excluding for the moment this period in Croatia, which is characterized 
by the war, war damages (Table 2) and war expenditures, it can be said 
that the basic barriers which should be overcome to achieve 
transformation to "The Hard Budget Constraints" refer to the ownership 
and market transition. I especially think here of the accelerated 
privatization which is an essential precondition for both development 
and the function of institutions of the labour and capital markets and in 
general for the market allocation of investments. This refers also to the 
whole financial complex which must transit in the direction of the 
privatization of commercial banks, which still represent a prolonged arm 
of the state. It should be mentioned in this connection that the role of 
the state in this phase of the transition of the Croatian economy is very 
evident. That could be partly explained by the war and partly by the 
domination of the state ownership. Direct interference of the state in the 
monetary sphere in searching for those solutions which should be found 
by the fiscal sphere (such as selective loans for agriculture, export of 
ships and equipment etc.) represented during the last years a factor of 
slowing down the transformation to "The Hard Budget Constraints" 
(Hunke 1991).10 The stabilization program which has been recently 
adopted by the Government of the Republic of Croatia will represent, it 
seems, a good basis for a further transition of the macroeconomic 
environment and for a more stable economic development in 1994. 
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(4) Macroeconomic stabilization program11 
 
The fourth point I would like to talk about refers to the Macroeconomic 
stabilization program. During 1993, negative tendencies in the 
economic development continued. 
 
In September, monthly inflation rate escalated over the psychological 
barrier of 30 % (retail price 30,6 %, living expenses 32,4 %, producer 
prices of industrial products 37,8 %). All this movement took place in 
the conditions of the indexation used by the  economic  policy during 
the last and this year. The effect known from the theory and practice 
(which is usually connected with the experience of Israel and Mihael 
Bruno), that the application of the indexation method can neither slow 
down inflation nor protect the standard of living of the employed, has 
been confirmed once again (Bruno 1993).12 On the contrary, the  case 
of Croatia showed that the application of the indexation method, 
because of inflationary taxation, decreased continuously the real 
demand and consequently restricted the scope for production and 
consumption. Besides, hyperinflation, leading to the redistribution on 
the account of the poor, constantly worsened the already difficult social 
situation in Croatia. ln connection with the social situation in Croatia, 
one should have in mind (in Table 1), that gross domestic product of 
this year is being achieved at the level of 50 % in relation to the prewar 
1990 and that at the same time the average salary per employee is at 
the level of 37 %. The growing number of retirement benefit  users in 
the conditions of the declining employment leads to a more and more 
unfavorable proportion between the active and supported population. 
0,75 of the retired persons come on every employee in the Croatian 
economy. If we add a number of over half a million of refugees and 
disabled persons, then to every employee in the Croatian economy 
corresponds 1,3 supported persons. All this is connected with a very 
low level of the average and especially minimum wages. The minimum 
wage which makes the basis for the social help, was 124.318. HRD 
(about 60 DEM)(Laski 1992)13 in July. The total number of the owners 
of social cards amounted at the end of August to 84.238 persons, 
including   188.326   household   members.14   All  together,  the  social 
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picture shows a big impoverishment and disintegration of the population 
with deep and increasing social differences. Many deviations connected 
with the ownership transition and privatization, and with the war 
profiteering, contribute very much to the quick disintegration of the 
population and to the increase in social differences in Croatia. In such a 
situation, the task of simultaneous renewal, reconstruction, restructuring 
and development, is imposed upon the economic policy as a crucial 
necessity, in the sense of the conditio sine qua non (Zdunić 1993).15 
However, in order to start the reconstruction and development, the 
escalating inflation must be stopped. Taking into account the urgent 
necessity of breaking inflation, at the beginning of October 1993, the 
Government of the Republic of Croatia decided in coordination with the 
National Bank of Croatia to "carry out the final part of the stabilization 
program". It can be already seen from such formulation that the 
Government intends to radicalize the implementation of the stabilization 
program, which in conceptional sense was already accepted before as 
the basis of the economic policy. Analyzing the causes and character of 
the escalating inflation in Croatia, the economists in numerous articles 
and studies prepared in 1992 and 1993 pointed out, that the 
macroeconomic policy stabilization should be implemented in two 
phases. In the first phase it should break the expected "psychological" 
inflation, and in the second phase, the so-called, real, structural or 
chronic inflation. Simulation studies have shown that about two thirds of 
the inflation rate have been under the influence of the expected 
inflation, and about one third under the influence of real factors 
(Rohatinski 1993).16 A contraction of the market belongs to these 
factors, which was reflected in a big decline in the use of capacity and 
in labour productivity in the growth of expenditures, deficit of the public 
sector caused by noneconomic reasons, in the monopolistic behavior of 
domestic producers along with a high tax pressure, as well as in the 
problems in the transport and energy sectors. 
 
With a view to intensify the first phase and to break the expected 
inflation, the classical approach which relies on four anchors was 
adopted. The first anchor refers to the intervention exchange rate (fixed 
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at the level of 20 % of devaluation), the second to the primary money, 
the third to the discount rate and the fourth to the salaries. These four 
anchors have been introduced in combination with the decrease in tax 
rates, and the introduction of the internal convertibility of the national 
currency. 
 
In view of the general economic, political,social and defense 
circumstances in Croatia, a crucial question of implementation of such a 
program was a political consensus, which it seems, the Government 
successfully assumed. The political consensus is especially important in 
the context of the budget deficit in broader sense. Cumulated amount of 
the monetarized internal budget deficit (measured by the growth of 
money supply) reached in the period January - August, a figure of DM 
777 million, which is over 13 % of the estimated gross domestic product 
(Anušić 1993).17 
 
This level of deficit, autonomously generated into average rate of the 
price growth of about 16 %, in the above period. It can be estimated, 
that about one half of this rate is a result of the increase in primary 
money quantity intended for the purchase of foreign currency or for 
foreign exchange transactions in a broader sense. The second part of 
the above inflation rate is in the conditions  (of at least formally 
balanced budget amounting 32 % of the gross  domestic product) due 
to some soft budget constraints, in enterprises and funds of public 
sectors. That refers especially to the sectors in infrastructure and 
energy such as electric power, postal, telegraph and telephone 
services, railways, as well as to the funds of health, retirement and 
disability insurance. Currency reserves cumulated and financed on the 
basis of money emission represented  a  crucial element of the 
accepted stabilization program. The achieved level of  currency 
reserves (of 1222 million dollars) enabled at the  same time the 
essential reduction in their growth on the basis of the money emission, 
and  their  use as the source for the potential financing of non- 
economic state expenditures. The program includes also a stabilization 
of material expenditures of the state budget and of various funds. It 
requires   also   an   improvement  in  the  financial  discipline  in   public 
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enterprises and in those that are predominantly in the state ownership, 
especially after the harmonization of relative prices. 
 
However, as I have already mentioned, the central place in the 
realization of the Program belongs to foreign currency reserves. But it 
should be pointed out that they are not in the classical sense the result 
of the trends and relations in the balance of payments and trade. They 
developed as a result of the specific internal foreign currency 
transactions, especially with the population sector. That can be also 
illustrated by the fact that commodity exports is in the eight month 
period January - August of 1993, in relation to the same period of 1992, 
lower by 13,7 %. As a consequence, coverage of imports by exports 
declined in the same period from 108,4 % to 88,4 %. The last year's 
surplus of 240 million dollars was transformed in the same period of this 
year into a deficit of 352 million dollars. 
 
However, thanks to those peculiarities, foreign exchange reserves 
increased during the first nine months of this year by 555 million dollars 
at the simultaneous decrease in the external debt. From total reserves 
of 1222 million dollars, the Central bank controls 473 million dollars. It 
will probably suffice for the realization of the initial phase of the 
stabilization program even without an usual support of the 
corresponding international financial organizations. The realization of 
the second phase probably supposes the support of these 
organizations, especially of the IMF. As a proof of such evaluation, it 
should be mentioned that the above foreign exchange reserves could 
cover three month commodity imports or two month total transactions 
from abroad. Even more important point is that foreign exchange 
reserves have become an essential component in the structure of total 
money resources. The dinar counter value of foreign exchange 
reserves was at the end of September of this year four times bigger 
from the total quantity of local money (M1). 
 
At the same time, the dinar counter value of foreign exchange reserves 
of the Central bank was 4,8 times bigger than the cash money 
circulation. Net  foreign  currency  assets  of the Central bank amount to 
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62 % of its total assets. Such a structure of the total money resources 
makes it possible that foreign exchange reserves, although not 
formally,have the function of a parallel currency. The role of this parallel 
(informal) currency could alleviate negative effects of monetary 
restrictions without strengthening inflationary pressures. This "substitute 
of the local currency" may help especially well the financing of the 
production for export. Such approach to the concept of the Program of 
economic stabilization is based on the assumption that some 
expenditures, especially government expenditures, whose financing 
should rely upon the existing foreign currency reserves, will not 
essentially increase (Rohatinski 1993).18 
 
It can be concluded from all what was said that the Government of the 
Republic of Croatia has adopted the stabilization program in very 
difficult circumstances, both economic and social. However, the 
urgency of creating conditions for the beginning of the reconstruction 
and development could not tolerate any delay, from the economic, 
social and political aspects. 
 
Although the stabilization program was adopted  a few weeks ago, 
some positive moments can be already seen. That especially refers to 
the political consensus attained and to the creation of the social 
psychology that the stabilization is a common interest. The first 
concrete market and financial reactions are as it was expected. The 
Croatian dinar became overnight not only internally (constrained) 
convertible, but also the most demanded commodity. On the basis of 
supply and demand, it came to the lower  rate of exchange in the 
market in relation to German mark, i.e. in relation to the 20 % 
devaluated level of 4444 HRD for one German mark. The first problems 
of the dinar liquidity have been solved  at this moment. However, we 
are going to face more serious problems. They will especially appear, 
along with the problems of dinar liquidity, in the sphere of production 
and personal income. Big social problems, which are partly covered by 
the existing social program, will during the realization of the program 
become even bigger. Therefore, not only the social and economic 
policy, but  the  policy in  general, must  pay a special attention to them. 
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Although we are able to forecast with a big certainty only big 
uncertainties, it must be underlined again that the stabilization program 
could not have been delayed anymore. It does not exclude the question 
of why it was not adopted already earlier. However, the answer to this 
question is beyond the scope of these considerations. 
 
 
(5) The problems and perspectives of transition 
 
The fifth point I would like to tell something about refers to the problems 
and perspectives of transition. The short experience in the realization of 
the economies and policies of transition in ex - socialist countries show 
that the problems are far bigger, more complicated, conflicting, and 
controversial, than anyone of those who during the passed years 
worked on the preparation and realization of the transition could expect. 
Confronted with so big and unexpected problems, the experts and 
politicians started hesitating about some strategic questions of the 
realization of transition. One of the most important strategic question 
relates probably to the time dimension, i.e. to the speed with which the 
transition can be achieved. Many experts who deal with the problems of 
transition gave numerous arguments in favor of the transition by "shock" 
methods. Other experts presented arguments in favor of a gradual "step 
by step" transition. However, if the main tasks of transition are analyzed 
detached, it is easily seen that these are actually quasi-dilemmas. Such 
conclusion is based on a well-known fact that the basic task of transition 
in the economic sphere consists in developing institutions, legal bases, 
and mechanisms, especially in the sphere of the ownership, of the 
market, and the entrepreneurship and of the macroeconomic 
environment, which will help improving the management and decision 
making quality, and on that basis a more efficient development 
(Somogyi 1993).19 
 
Everybody also agrees that the basic task of transition in the political 
sphere is the development of the multiparty parliamentary democracy, 
of the function of the law  state  and the protection of human rights  and 
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freedoms, and in the final analysis the development of a modern 
society. From what was said, it follows that the transition is such a 
social process that penetrates into all economic and political contents of 
life of each country in transition. By its nature, these processes are 
loaded by numerous deviations and dangers. Two groups of deviations 
are common. The first group appears under the common denominator 
"neobolshevism", in the sense of the over-accentuation of the role of the 
state in the realization of transition. The second group of transitional 
deviations appears under the common denominator "Latin American 
syndrome" in the sense of the negation of any function of state, legal or 
social. 
 
In some countries in transition the deviations from both groups appear 
simultaneously. They take the shape of the disintegration of the society 
and of the unjustified increase in social differences on the basis of 
different forms of maffia's activity, organized crime, black - marketing, 
war profiteering etc. 
 
In connection with these very trivial manifestations of transition in some 
countries, it is important to have in mind the well-known political and 
economic interdependence between the ownership pluralism (in the 
sense of the dominant role of the private ownership), market pluralism 
(in the sense of the function of the integral market, especially labour 
and capital markets) and political structure pluralism (in the  sense of 
the legal state function and the protection of human rights and 
freedoms). 
 
The crucial question here is the ownership pluralization in the sense of 
a predominant privatization. The abolition of all monopolies in the 
market, and in the political power, cannot be even theoretically 
imagined without private ownership. Privatization is consequently the 
condition for the increase in economic efficiency and in political 
democracy. However, all countries in transition have still a predominant 
role of the state ownership. Even Croatia, with a predominant social 
property until the middle of last year is now in a phase of its 
transformation when the state ownership predominates. 
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Due to the war, Croatia is perhaps not the best example for 
generalizations. Yet it should be said that both kinds of deviations 
mentioned above are very noticeable. That includes also an 
uncontrolled disintegration of the population, big social differences, 
economically unjustified enrichment, war profiteering, weakening of the 
social function of the state, etc. On the other hand, in the conditions of 
the transformation of the social into the state ownership even those 
mechanisms of control, which had existed in the self - management 
system, disappeared. Such circumstances increase as a rule the role 
and influence of state in all spheres of social life. On the example of 
Croatia that is felt not only in the economy, but in all other social 
activities. A series of laws recently adopted by the Croatian Parliament 
which relate to the science, universities, government administration etc., 
overemphasize the role of the state. And although some definitive 
generalizations cannot be made in regard of the short time and 
insufficient experience, it should be reminded in one popular slogan 
which says, that by too much insisting on the best solutions the chances 
can be lost to accept at least those solutions which are good. 
 
The best method of privatization is undoubtedly the selling of the 
shares. In this way, the problems of additional accumulation for 
development and the problems of management quality are 
simultaneously solved, which is directly connected with the improved 
efficiency and profitability. 
 
However, the experience in most countries in transition has shown that 
the domestic purchasing power was very limited. Very limited are also 
net financial surpluses in the international market. If the privatization in 
the countries in transition proceeded at such speed, the process would 
take not several years, but several decades. It has been also shown by 
the example of Croatia, although, because of the war, it cannot be 
generalized. 
 
If the transition were not a social process with its inherent deviations 
discussed above, the question of the time dimension  in  the 
privatization of the ownership would not necessarily have  an  important 
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significance. However, taking into account all the concrete problems 
involved, it is urgently needed in the process of the transition of 
ownership to sell as soon as possible everything what under normal 
conditions can be sold. As for the rest of the state capital the methods 
should be applied that would accelerate the privatization. This relates in 
particular to the application of the method of the distribution of the 
shares and vouchers to the workers and to all citizens. It seems that the 
government of the Republic of Croatia is going to apply this approach at 
the end of 1993 or at the beginning of 1994. 
 
There should be, however, no illusion that the accelerated privatization 
will bring an end to all deviations and problems discussed above. On 
the contrary, some of them may become even sharper. But in 
overcoming them we will at least know that we are on the right track 
and that, with all difficult problems and contradictions, we move towards 
the exit from the deep crisis. 
 
Today unfortunately we must conclude that a much higher price must 
be paid for creating the macroeconomic environment conducive to the 
transition, that any one of us, working in the past years on the problems 
of transition and reforms, had anticipated. These conditions relate in the 
first place to the integral market, in particular the labour and capital 
markets that would make possible a market allocation of investments 
and a more efficient development. 
 
In this phase of transition the role of the state must be large, 
recognizable and qualified, but to a greatest extent must be limited to 
the creation of a necessary macroeconomic environment. Very 
pronounced must be also the function of the law state and the social 
state. All countries in transition are also still facing important questions 
of a strategic character. 
 
It is also important to keep in mind that in different countries the 
problems of priorities and of graduality in the transition process may be 
different because individual countries are not equally prepared for such 
processes. 
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Croatia and Slovenia have a long reform tradition and belong therefore 
to those countries that are better prepared for transition. It may be 
illustrated by the fact that despite the war and war devastations the war 
economy has not been introduced in Croatia. In this connection I would 
like to quote my book "Economics and Politics of Transition" (Vojnić 
1993),20 which has been recently promoted in Zagreb, where I, 
paraphrasing the Bible, some strategic questions of transition put under 
a common denominator "Quo vadis domine?" The search for the 
answer to this question in the case of Croatia relates to the contents 
and character of the social function of the state in the Croatian version 
of the state and economy of welfare. This question relates also owing 
particularly to the transition in Croatia, to the role and place of the 
selfmanagement in the sense of the participation of~the workers in the 
management and profit, in the entire process of transition and further 
development of the overall economic and social system. Equally 
important is also the role and place of the self-government in the 
development of the government administration and of the total political 
structure. 
 
Finally, at the same level of importance, this question refers to the 
whole complex of protection of the human environment and the 
problems of pollution. When Croatia is in question, this complex 
especially refers to the protection of the sea, rivers, lakes and forests. 
Big damages have been already done, worse must be prevented. 
 
These are only some of the questions to which the strategists of the 
economy and policy of transition must find answers (Puhovski 1993).21 
Deeper treatment of these problems is beyond the scope of these 
considerations. 
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(6) Instead of concluding considerations 
 
Finally, instead of the concluding considerations I would like to 
underline only several points. 
 
(1) The problems of the realization of transition are far more difficult, 
complex and controversial then it was earlier presumed. 
 
(2) The fundamental question (especially in Croatia)of the exit from the 
hard transitional crisis refers to the renewal, restructuring, 
reconstruction and development. 
 
(3) The stable development presumes such a macroeconomic 
environment where all economic and other subjects must behave 
according to the criteria of "The Hard Budget Constraint". 
 
(4) The precondition for such macroeconomic environment is the 
ownership transition in the direction of privatization, including also the 
privatization of banks, along with the function of integral market, 
especially of the labour and capital markets. 
 
(5) The dilemma of "shock therapy" or of gradual movements is in the 
final analysis a quasi-dilemma. Transition, especially privatization, must 
be carried out in different steps. It is a question of social processes 
which are proned to various deviations. That part of the state capital 
which in the last few years could not be sold , should be privatized by 
the application of various stimulative methods, including the distribution 
(through shares and vouchers) of one part of the state capital. 
 
(6) Privatization, development of institutions and instruments of labour 
and capital market, as well as market allocation of investment and 
capital, cannot be accomplished without great social spasms and 
tensions. It is important that these social processes of transition are 




(7) The strategy of transition, especially in the case of Croatia, must 
emphasize in the first place the role of the legal and social state. It has 
also to take clear attitudes concerning the character of the "State and 
Economics of Welfare" including the questions of the self management, 
self - government and the protection of human environment. 
 
(8) The realization of the economy and policy of transition in all 
countries in transition, including Croatia and Slovenia, must always take 
into account the well-known political and economic interdependence 
between the ownership transition, market transition and the transition of 
political structure. Only in the context of the realization of that 
interdependence economic efficiency and political democracy can be 
increased. And this is the only possible way of the exit from the hard 
transitional crisis. 
 
(9) It goes without saying that the efficient realization of transition in all 
the countries of the post - socialist world will be decisively determined 
by the willingness of the countries of the developed market economy, to 
support the processes of transition financially and through the help of 
the corresponding international financial institutions, where a special 
role must belong to the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. That especially refers to 
those countries which, as is the case with Croatia, have found 
themselves in an extraordinary difficult situation caused by the imposed 
war, war damages, thousands and thousands of refugees and 
displaced persons. 
 
(10) With regard to the globalization and internationalization of all 
relations (economic, political, military, defensive, ecological and etc.) in 
the contemporary world, the efficient realization of Economics and 
Politics of Transition in all countries in transition, is of the common 




(11) Considering the fact that in the years to come, the complex of the 
economy and policy of transition will be a very important sphere of 
research in social (and not only social) sciences, it is indispensable that 
the international institutions which are interested in it, systematically 
assure financial resources for the realization of such projects. This 
relates especially fo the World and the European Bank. International 
Monetary Fund the corresponding funds of the European Comrnunity, 
as well as to the other large funds, well known in the world, such as 
Ford's etc. As for the research institutions, the priority in financing 
should been given to those institutes which have been already 
distinguished in this research, such as Vienna Institute for Comparative 
Economic Studies; Institute for International Economic and Political 
Research; Academy of Science of the Russian Federation, Moscow; 
Institute for Comparative Policy Studies, Florida State University, 
Tallahassee; and the others similar to them. 
 
(12) In view of the importance and of many peculiarities which should 
be overcome by all countries in transition it would be very useful that a 
special international institution deals with the financing of 
reconstruction, restructuring and development of the countries in 
transition. That can be a new specialized for those purposes, or a 
specialized sector of the already existing international financial 
institutions. There are many principles for the assumptions that such 
specialized institutions could be most easily and suitably organized 
within the framework of the already existinG European Bank 
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